Medical Populism and COVID-19 Testing by Hedges, Kristin & Lasco, Gideon
Ateneo de Manila University 
Archīum Ateneo 
Development Studies Faculty Publications Development Studies Department 
4-30-2021 
Medical Populism and COVID-19 Testing 
Kristin Hedges 
Gideon Lasco 
Follow this and additional works at: https://archium.ateneo.edu/dev-stud-faculty-pubs 
 Part of the Analytical, Diagnostic and Therapeutic Techniques and Equipment Commons, 
Development Studies Commons, and the Health Communication Commons 
Open Anthropological Research 2021; 1: 73–86
Research Article
Kristin Hedges*, Gideon Lasco
Medical Populism and COVID-19 Testing
 Open Access. © 2021 Kristin Hedges, Gideon Lasco, published by De Gruyter.  This work is licensed under the Creative Commons 
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/opan-2020-0109 
received August 28, 2020; accepted April 30, 2021.
Abstract: This paper uses the lens of medical populism to analyze the impact of biocommunicability on COVID-19 
testing through a case study approach. The political efficacy of testing is traced through two mini-case studies: the 
Philippines and the United States. The case studies follow the approach of populism scholars in drawing from various 
sources that ‘render the populist style visible’ from the tweets and press releases of government officials to media 
reportage. Using the framework of medical populism, the case studies pay attention to the ways in which coronavirus 
testing figured in (1) simplification of the pandemic; (2) spectacularization of the crisis; (3) forging of divisions; and (4) 
invocation of knowledge claims. Identifying and critically analyzing how knowledge is generated is an essential step to 
recognizing the impact that political styles have on the COVID pandemic. The political actors in each case study have 
shaped knowledge of the epidemic, in the way they construct the idea of ‘testing’, and in how they mobilize testing as 
an ‘evidence-making practice’. Their actions shaped how the pandemic—as well as their responses—is measured. This 
framework contributes to public policy debates by providing evidence of the impact of medical populism on pandemic 
response efforts. 
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1  Introduction
As the COVID-19 pandemic has spread across the world, we have seen drastic differences in responses to this 
unprecedented health crisis along political lines. Political influence—including individual political actors—has affected 
not just how the virus is transmitted, but how knowledge is produced, and how technology is mobilized—especially in 
the context of the first pandemic to emerge while citizens have instant access to information at their fingertips. Given 
the central role of information in the pandemic, this paper uses the lens of medical populism to analyze the impact of 
biocommunicability—that is, the production, circulation, contestation, and materialization of medical knowledge—on 
COVID-19 testing through a case study approach. We argue that through discursive practices and policy responses, 
coronavirus testing became a populist trope that simplifies and spectacularizes the COVID-19 crisis. Testing has drawn 
its valence from its ability to quantify the pandemic and render the coronavirus visible—as well as from the ways it has 
been performed and mediatized. 
We trace the political efficacy of coronavirus testing through two mini-case studies: the Philippines and the United 
States. Amid a worsening pandemic, coronavirus testing in the Philippines emerged as a contested field that allowed 
political actors to either cast themselves as heroes (e.g. through the spectacularization of testing programs—including 
substandard rapid antibody tests)—or cast the government’s response as a failure (e.g. through demands for ‘mass 
testing’). Meanwhile, in the United States, the simplification of the crisis through a denialism of its severity slowed 
the government’s ability to ramp up testing, likewise raising critiques of a failed response—and demands for scaled 
up testing as key to controlling to the pandemic. Both case studies show that the efficacy of coronavirus testing lies 
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beyond its ability to define, however imperfectly, the positive or negative infection status of individuals or populations, 
but also the fortunes of individual political actors and their decision-making, which can spell the difference between 
life and death for their publics. That health crises are increasingly vulnerable to politicization has been evidenced 
in recent years, and SARS-CoV-2 is showing how this divisiveness puts the whole world at risk. Analyzing the public 
policy-making process using the medical populism biocommunicability concepts, this paper illustrates the impacts of 
individual political actors on effective response efforts during a pandemic.
2  Background
The field of anthropology has a long history of engaging with epidemics. Relative to the AIDS epidemic anthropologists 
have contributed a diverse array of work, including calls for culturally appropriate approaches to AIDS prevention 
(Bolton & Singer, 1992) and local understanding of stigma and social construction of HIV/AIDS (Castro & Farmer, 
2005; Moyer et al., 2013). Within outbreaks of influenza anthropologists highlighted a need to focus on diverse issues 
from politics of knowledge and blame (Leach & Tadros, 2014) to biopolitics (Briggs & Nichter, 2009). During the 2013-
2016 Ebola epidemic of West Africa anthropologists highlighted the importance of community-centered responses 
to epidemic control (Abramowitz et al., 2015) and the positive impact of involving local knowledge and expertise in 
the response effort (Richards, 2016). Recently epidemic responses have been impacted by the rise of global populist 
movements. 
Hewing closely with the strands of populism scholarship that emphasized the stylistic and rhetorical elements 
of political performances (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; Brubaker, 2017), Lasco & Curato (2019) introduced the concept of 
‘medical populism’ to describe “a political style that constructs antagonistic relations between ‘the people’ whose lives 
have been put at risk by ‘the establishment’ in the context of health crises” (p. 1). While any contemporary issue can be 
used as a populist trope, they argued that health emergencies are particularly vulnerable to politicization given their 
demands for urgent action and their life-and-death consequences. Following Moffitt (2016), medical populism was 
defined as a style that thrives by simplifying and spectacularizing complex public health issues, alongside the classic 
populist element of forging divisions. When faced with fear of a novel virus, there can be a tendency to divide society 
into ‘us’ and ‘others’, which leads people to distance themselves from the perceived threat (Ennis-McMillan & Hedges, 
2020). We have seen this divisiveness play out in other health emergencies such as the initial ‘moral panic’ around HIV/
AIDS (Farmer, 1990), as well as recent infectious disease outbreaks like H1N1 (Schoch-Spana, 2008), and Ebola (Gomez-
Temesio, 2018). 
Building on the above literature, Lasco (2020a) identified four elements of medical populism in the COVID-
19 pandemic, namely, (1) simplifying and downplaying the pandemic and denial to the promise of treatments; (2) 
dramatization of the crisis and government’s responses to it; (3) forging of divisions between the public, elites, and 
‘dangerous others’; and (4) invocation of knowledge claims to support the above. Such, a style, The Lancet averred, has 
contributed to countries’ failure to address the pandemic (Sacks et al., 2020). While warning that populist leaders have 
heterogenous responses and that the lens of populism has explanatory limits, populism scholars have nonetheless 
acknowledged that this kind of analysis has significance that ‘goes beyond the hype of merely putting the words 
‘pandemic,’ ‘crisis’ and ‘populism’ in the same sentence’ (Katsambekis & Stavrakakis, 2020, p. 4; see also Brubaker, 
2020; Speed & Mannion, 2020). 
To further understand how this political discourse has played out in the public sphere, an investigation of 
‘biocommunicability’ (Briggs & Nichter, 2009; Briggs & Hallin, 2010) is useful. The notion of biocommunicability calls 
attention to the practices that structure the circulation of medical knowledge, the performativity of this knowledge in 
constructing subjects of biomedicine, and the links between people’s responses to information and uptake or resistance 
to the messaging. In the context of emerging and ever-expanding global connectivity, knowledge circulation happens 
at rapid speed and from multiple directions simultaneously. Within this complex web of knowledge production and 
circulation is a lively dynamic of validity and ‘fake news’. COVID-19 pandemic has coincided with a parallel ‘infodemic’ 
(Starbird et al., 2020; WHO, 2020), described by the World Health Organization (WHO) as widespread sharing of false 
and misleading information. In crises people strive to gain knowledge and understanding of what is happening, 
resulting in searching, disseminating, and synthesizing content (Starbird et al., 2020). This process is called ‘collective 
Medical Populism and COVID-19 Testing    75
sensemaking’ and is a critical step in being able to respond to crisis situations (Comfort et al., 2004; Shklovski et 
al., 2008). Campaigns of misinformation can influence collective sensemaking and range from spreading organically 
through friends and relatives on social media to government officials working to consolidate political power. 
Living through a pandemic, what is at stake in these contestations of medical knowledge is not just the political 
fortunes of public officials but also their decision-making, which affects the lives and livelihoods of their constituents—
particularly in moments of crisis when exceptional measures are justified. As Briggs and Nichter write: “Any account of 
infectious disease reifies certain players, circuits, practices, forms of authority and imbues them with different moral 
and affective characters to produce and hold knowledge” (2009, p. 193). In other words, biocommunicability becomes 
a matter of biopolitics. The specific focus of this article is the public sphere model for biocommunicability, in which 
“information is assumed to be useful because it helps citizens and policy-makers to make collective decisions about the 
public interest” (Briggs & Hallin, 2010, p. 152). Using this model, we focus on how information on COVID-19 responses 
has been communicated by politicians to the public across media platforms as a form of knowledge generation. 
There are many aspects of the pandemic that have emerged as populist tropes and fault lines for 
biocommunicability—from its very nature (e.g. “It came from a laboratory in Wuhan”), the infectiousness of the 
pandemic, to the possibility of cures and vaccines (e.g. hydrochlorquine or bleach) (Lasco, 2020). The linchpin to 
communicating about the pandemic, from transmission rates to response efforts, is testing. Anthropologists have 
contributed substantially to the literature on testing during epidemic outbreaks, including exploring how testing can 
take on dimensions of morality (Hardon et al., 2011; Moyer et al., 2013) and equity (Castro & Farmer, 2005). Stigma 
and discrimination have emerged as prominent themes in these debates. As Schoch-Spana declared in reference to 
the influenza pandemic, using a ‘fortress mentality’ of imposing quarantines does not always translate into effective 
disease control because it creates a “geography of blame” (2006, p. 36). Lowe (2010) demonstrated with the Southeast 
Asia H5N1 avian influenza that responses focused on stopping the disease ‘there’ before it came ‘here’ created 
boundaries between ‘risk’ and ‘blame’. In addition, Briggs (2004) cautioned against the “politics of exclusion” during 
cholera epidemics in Venezuela. This article contributes to the literature on viral testing by analyzing the political 
dimensions of testing, mindful of its ‘symbolic power’ by making the invisible real (Hedges, 2020)—and its prominent 
role in framing COVID-19’s ‘outbreak narrative’ (Leach & Tadros, 2014). 
There is also a rapidly growing body of literature analyzing policy and political responses to the pandemic. 
Serikbayeva et al. (2020) analyzed state capacity in responding to COVID-19 and found government effectiveness as a 
key association for lower death rates. Capano (2020) traced the COVID outbreak in Italy and demonstrated that a robust 
response effort was only possibly through ‘careful preparedness and experience policy-makers (p. 341). Klingler-Vidra 
et al. (2020) analyzed Vietnam’s state effectiveness and capacity for COVID-19 testing services. Vietnam’s successful 
development and deliveries of rapid tests were due, in part, to the widespread mobilization of different sectors to 
respond to the crisis. Their findings support that a key to successfully controlling the pandemic is the ability to mobilize 
and coordinate international, governmental, and non-governmental responses. 
Less explored, however, have been the impacts of populism on health policies, and to return to our earlier concern 
on biocommunicability, how populism mediates publics’ understandings of infectious disease outbreaks. Notable 
exceptions include Speed and Mannion’s (2020, p. 1977) work on right-wing populism which found that ‘populist 
policies tend to create specific barriers and challenges for people accessing services’. Pavolini et al. (2018) also identify 
which healthcare systems which were more resistant to populist discourse: those that are well resourced, guided by 
network-based governance, and have medical professionals involved in the policy process (p. 1147). Our contribution to 
this debate is to analyze how a particular technology—i.e. COVID testing—has been used as a populist trope in various 
ways, and in the process, illustrate the impacts of medical populism on governance during times of health crisis.
3  Case Studies 
Two mini-case studies are presented in this paper, looking at how coronavirus testing emerged as populist tropes in 
two countries: the Philippines and the United States. These two countries—one representing the Global North, another 
the Global South—underscore the geographic and cultural range of its instantiations, particularly in light of the two 
countries’ distinct political contexts: a polarized, two-party system in the US (Lee, 2020), and a more personality-based 
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political regime in the Philippines (Teehankee & Kasuya, 2020). Noteworthy, too, are the authoritarian tendencies of two 
countries’ leaders—albeit with varying degrees of actualization: while President Rodrigo Duterte has been implicated in 
extrajudicial killings and acts of violence, Donald Trump’s attempts to go beyond his Constitutional powers have been 
‘[clumsy] and to little effect’ (Lowndes, 2020, p. 54). Additionally, the authors are citizens and medical anthropologists 
living in each of these chosen countries, and, as participant-observers, their lived experiences and emic perspectives of 
the pandemic likewise inform this paper. 
Each case study was written independently by each author and follow the approach of populism scholars in drawing 
from various sources that ‘render the populist style visible’ (Lasco & Curato, 2019), from the tweets and press releases 
of government officials to media reportage (Moffitt, 2016; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Lasco, 2020a). Following 
a brief overview of the pandemic in the country, each case study is organized thematically, highlighting instances in 
which coronavirus testing materialized in the actions and rhetoric of political actors—and how the public responded 
to such performances. Using the framework of medical populism, the case studies pay particular attention to the ways 
in which coronavirus testing figured in (1) the simplification of the pandemic; (2) spectacularization of the crisis; (3) 
forging of divisions; and (4) invocation of knowledge claims. 
3.1  Testing in the Philippines
Elected in 2016, Rodrigo Duterte’s administration has been dominated by populist policies, including a deadly and 
spectacular ‘drug war’ that has claimed the lives of tens of thousands of people (Lasco, 2020a). He himself largely 
stayed away from a dengue vaccine scandal that implicated his predecessor. His allies have nonetheless engaged in 
medical populism, (Lasco & Larson, 2019), which would also characterize his response to the COVID-19 pandemic. He 
shifted from downplaying its significance to dramatizing his responses through displays of force, punitive lockdowns, 
and promises of a forthcoming vaccine. His critics have sharply criticized Duterte’s approach, claiming that he has 
used the pandemic to stifle dissent, perpetuate human rights abuses, and facilitate a public health crisis through his 
inaction, incompetence, and misplaced priorities. 
From the time the first COVID-19 cases were reported in late January, coronavirus testing has served a domain 
in which such political contestations have been instantiated, taking on heightened significance as the measure and 
substance of the nation’s overall health and as a signifier of the government’s overall pandemic response. Which kinds 
of tests (e.g. PCR vs. rapid tests), who gets tested (e.g. VIP testing vs #MassTestingPH), and what the tests reveal (e.g. 
positive vs. negative; “flattening the curve” vs. a worsening outbreak), all became points of tension and debate, pitting 
the national government against local politicians, critics, and health advocates. 
3.1.1  Testing as Spectacle
In the early stages of the outbreak, one of the major issues was the capability of the government to perform testing. 
Initially, the country’s Department of Health (DOH) had been sending samples to an Australian laboratory, and news 
coverage featured the agency’s steps towards acquiring capacity and reassuring the public that there were enough 
primers, test kits, and other supplies. On January 29, 2020, the DOH announced that the country could do local tests, 
and in mid-February announced the activation of “five subnational laboratories” in different major islands in the 
archipelagic country. “In line with its strategy to #BeatCovid19, DOH is accelerating its COVID-19 testing capacity,” the 
agency said in a press release (DOH, 2020).
As the number of cases increased, however, public dissatisfaction mounted, calling into question the adequacy 
of the government testing response and the long delays in test results. Political actors, including Vice President Leni 
Robredo, donated testing kits in an implicit rebuke of the government’s limited capabilities (Cepeda, 2020a). Others 
advocated for the use of rapid antibody or antigen tests, even as the DOH and other health experts insisted on using the 
RT-PCR test. “Our testing method, the real-time PCR, remains to be the gold standard because what we measure here 
is the virus, unlike in the other testing method in which it is the antibodies that are measured,” Secretary of Health 
Francisco Duque said on March 29 (Yasmuan et al., 2020).
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While the national government insisted on using PCR as its testing method, local governments used different 
testing capacities to highlight—and distinguish—their own pandemic responses. Governors and mayors scrambled to 
acquire testing kits and establish their own laboratories, at times embracing the rapid tests against the advice of DOH 
and many health experts. At the height of the ‘lockdown’, at least one provincial government conducted rapid testing 
to all incoming road travelers at a border checkpoint, projecting a safe, COVID-free zone to its citizenry.  
In one dramatic example, Marikina Mayor Marcy Teodoro took the initiative of installing a testing facility without 
DOH blessing. “Frustrated with red tape, Teodoro gave his ultimatum in the morning of April 14: accredit the lab or 
Marikina runs the facility without the DOH,” as one news article (Cepeda, 2020b) reported. Another high-profile mayor, 
Manila Mayor Isko Moreno, would initiate “drive thru testing”, claiming that “we have confirmed that people would want 
to have themselves tested but they do not have access to such” (Lalu, 2020), in another implicit rebuke of the national 
government’s response. While the testing Moreno was offering utilized rapid antibody tests, this crucial distinction was 
lost in the ensuing, and largely-positive, media—and social media—coverage that the mayor gained. “This is what the 
[national] government should be doing! Thank you Mayor,” a news report quoted an online commenter as saying (Yap, 
2020). 
3.1.2  Testing and Division
Another politically-fraught point of contention in the country was who would be able to access testing. In late February, 
the DOH categorized people as “Persons Under Investigation” (PUI) or those with symptoms and a history of travel 
to areas with COVID-19 and “Persons under Monitoring” (PUM) or those who came into contact with PUIs—with only 
the former eligible for testing (DOH, 2020a). Even as health advocates pointed to the examples of other countries that 
embraced widespread testing, the DOH and other health experts justified these narrow criteria given the government’s 
limited testing infrastructure. 
This already-restrictive criteria, however, was undermined by news of prominent politicians and their families 
accessing testing in violation of the policy. What quickly came to be called “VIP testing” elicited outrage, especially 
amid news reports that some health professionals had died without finding out their status. “What hurts me the most is 
that here we are, risking our lives, getting exposed to COVID-19, and we can’t even get ourselves and our patients tested,” 
one frontline medical worker told the author. The outrage over “VIP testing” was accompanied by public demand for 
scaled-up testing, which were instantiated via social media hashtags such as #MassTestingNow and #MassTestingPH. 
Through these social media campaigns people demanded that the government test more people, a position informed by 
a comparative paradigm that evaluated the Philippine government’s response to that of other countries as well as the 
WHO’s own call for scaled-up testing. 
Despite the DOH’s reticence to pursue “mass testing”, it seemed to have been countermanded by the president’s 
“Inter-Agency Task Force” (IATF), which was in charge of the overall pandemic response. “We are determined to fast 
track the accreditation of subnational laboratories so we can start the massive testing of persons under investigation 
(PUIs) and persons under monitoring (PUMs),” Carlito Galvez, the head of the IATF, declared on April 1. “We expect that 
by April 14 we should be able to start massive testing” (Ornedo, 2020). 
However, as the government failed to reach its stated targets for testing, it later claimed ‘mass testing’ is neither 
feasible nor practicable. “We test those who need to be tested,” presidential spokesperson Harry Roque declared in May 
20, “not just because they want to be tested” (Nonato, 2020). He maintained that the plan was to continue “expanded 
target testing” covering (1) those showing symptoms of COVID-19, those who arrived in the country from abroad (such as 
overseas Filipino workers, or OFWs coming home), and those who were in close contact with confirmed COVID-19 cases.
Although the national government exhibited ambivalence towards the idea of ‘mass testing’, local politicians 
embraced it. In Iloilo, a city known for its independence and opposition to President Duterte as well as for a low number 
of COVID-19 cases until the time of writing, the mayor explained: “We pushed for mass testing because this was the only 
way that we would be able to find out if a person was infected and infectious” (Espina & Talabong, 2020). Various cities 
in Metro Manila—the national capital region—also used the language of ‘mass testing’ or ‘mass screening’, likewise 
communicating the adequacy of their response and the benefits of it to their own citizens, regardless of the quality and 
actual availability of those tests (e.g. Gotinga, 2020). 
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Opposition figures and health advocates, for their part, took to filing a petition before the Supreme Court to 
unsuccessfully compel the government to conduct “free mass testing”, reflecting its polarizing nature (see Vallejo & 
Ong, 2020). “Without mass testing, the public faces a never-ending quarantine. Without mass testing, the government 
allows the virus to claim precious Filipino lives, either by sickness or hunger,” the petitioners declared, adding: “The 
government’s failure to conduct mass testing as advised by experts and as effectively implemented by other countries 
and even some local government units is dangerous and deadly as it could mean that the coronavirus will not be 
detected in thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of Filipinos afflicted with the virus” (Navallo & Merez, 2020).
It is worth adding that although the government had been ambivalent towards mass testing, it has used increased 
testing as an explanation for rising number of cases. “There’s an increase or trend per week. This is because of our 
increased testing capacity because we’re also testing now asymptomatic individuals,” one health official reported in 
late July (Montemayor, 2020). Testing capacity was also invoked by the DOH as a sign of progress, hailing it as the 
highest in the Southeast Asia even as the Philippines emerged as the country with the highest number of cases in the 
region (Hallare, 2020). Such statements, and subsequent debates about the reporting of cases, reflect the continuous 
contestations not just about what kind of tests were used but what the test results signify in relation to the Philippines’ 
progress in controlling the outbreak.
3.1.3  Simplification and Invocation of Knowledge Claims 
The two, interrelated, issues of testing capacity and ‘mass testing’ reveals the emergence of COVID-19 testing as a 
political trope in the country, with the national government reassuring the public that its testing capacity was adequate, 
and that they were testing those who actually needed it. In contrast, other political actors, particularly those in local 
government, distinguished themselves from the national government by offering their own testing centers and methods 
(e.g. rapid antibody tests) as well as conducting testing beyond the parameters or criteria set by the government. In 
doing so, they sought to dramatize their response to the health crisis and forge a division between their response and 
those of the national government. Such dramatizations and divisions relied on knowledge claims (e.g. “Rapid tests are 
useless”), with ‘science’ at times being invoked and misused by various political actors. 
Meanwhile, the idea of testing also resonated with the public because testing quantified the pandemic, allowing it 
to be monitored and its results ritualized, while ‘mass testing’ took on a life of its own as the key to ending the pandemic. 
This heightened significance of testing led to debates that were more about semantics than the tests themselves. As a 
pro-administration blogger put it in late March, while the first demands of mass testing mounted (ThinkingPinoy, 2020):
So some camps are FINALLY adding some nuance to their Mass Testing advocacy, i.e. that mass testing covers only medical frontliners, 
PUIs, and PUMs. But isn’t that PRECISELY what the government has been trying to do for the past several weeks? Why advocate for 
something that the government is already desperately trying to do?…Oh please. So you’re now reducing the debate to semantic nitpi-
cking, when the fact of the matter is you’ve been hollering “MASS TESTING!” without any fine print for the past several weeks?
Such discourses of testing—most of which were carried out in social media—simplified the pandemic, and help explain 
its political and popular significance, regardless of its efficacies as an epidemiological tool. 
3.2  Testing in the United States 
President Trump was elected in 2016 on a populist agenda and was known for his dramatizing performances around 
crises, as demonstrated through examples “from building walls, deporting migrants and rounding up criminals” 
(Brubaker, 2017, p. 366). The Trump administration’s reaction to the COVID-19 crisis is a prime example of the 
repercussion of medical populism in response to a pandemic. From the first detected COVID positive case in the United 
States on January 20, 2020 (Harcourt et al., 2020), the national response was fraught with complications. President 
Trump’s denialist stance was epitomized by his calling the epidemic a ‘democratic hoax’ and something that would just 
‘disappear’ can still be felt among citizens today. In July 2020, while death rates were rising, Trump stated that “Many of 
those people are young people that would heal in a day. They have the sniffles” (Montanaro, 2020). 
Medical Populism and COVID-19 Testing    79
The politicizing of these perspectives created deep divisions within the country. The political trope of ‘hoax’ was 
predominately been taken up by citizens aligning with the Republican party. The messaging divided the country 
between his ‘base’ against the ‘liberals’ in response to a health risk. Trump’s denialism demonstrated a political style of 
medical populism which can be visually traced in the public through community members’ behavior, such as adhering 
to or rejecting mask wearing, a willingness or refusal to maintain social distance, and socializing in public or in pictures 
on social media. Testing for the virus was met with multiple roadblocks, including access to tests, supplies shortfalls, 
delays in receiving results, and discrepancies on where test results should be reported. 
3.2.1  Simplification of Pandemic
The Trump administration attempted to simplify the response to the COVID-19 pandemic by focusing on testing 
capacity as the single indicator of success. However, even when measured by this indicator the US response failed. 
Though the WHO warned of the potential global pandemic on January 30th and the US Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) stated that ‘It’s not so much a question of if this will happen anymore but rather more a question of 
exactly when this will happen” (CDC, 2020), the country was still underprepared for testing. The early months were 
faced with systematic failures. Initially, the Food and Drug Administration rules prevented state and commercial labs 
from developing their own coronavirus diagnostic tests, which hampered testing capacity (Patel, 2020). Additionally, 
the first coronavirus test kits sent out were found to have faulty negative controls caused by contaminated reagents 
(Cohen, 2020). Instead of focusing on fixing these crucial problems with early testing, Trump continued to simplify 
and downplay the pandemic with tropes such as ‘very well under control’, ‘we shut it down’, and ‘the risk to American 
people remains low’. 
3.2.2  Spectacularization of Crisis
By mid-March 2020 health emergencies were declared in multiple states and Trump shifted political style. On March 
13th he announced extensive plans for widespread testing by using the private sector throughout the US. “We’ve been 
in discussions with pharmacies and retailers to make drive-through tests available in the critical locations identified by 
public health professionals,” said President Trump. While Trump spectacularized the widespread plans for a testing 
program, he overlooked the supply chain needs for implementing an efficient national testing strategy. The promises of 
March were clearly falling short by April. 
We need to significantly ramp up not only the number of tests, but the capacity to perform them, so that you don’t have a situation where 
you have a test but it can’t be done because there isn’t a swab, or because there isn’t extraction media, or not the right vial,” Dr. Anthony 
Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, told Time magazine in late April 2020. “I am not overly confi-
dent right now at all that we have what it takes to do that. We are doing better, and I think we are going to get there, but we are not there 
yet (Park, 2020). 
Trump resisted numerous calls to invoke the ‘Defense Production Act,’ which would secure industrial production of 
needed medical supplies (i.e. testing materials, ventilators, PPE) (Kavi, 2020), claiming that it was the responsibility 
of the individual governors to obtain medical equipment, not the federal government (Rogers et al., 2020). By June, 
NPR reported that only 4% of the private sector stores in Trump’s testing strategy were hosting drive-through testing 
(Pfeiffer & Mak, 2020). Without a comprehensive national testing strategy, responsibility was pushed to state and local 
initiatives, resulting in disjointed efforts throughout the country. 
An additional challenge in delivering an impactful testing program was who qualified for a test. Early CDC guidelines 
were focused only on those with a history of travel to a COVID-19 infected area. These guidelines stayed in place even 
after evidence began emerge that community spread was happening. History of travel was finally dropped as a criterion, 
but the updated criteria still focused on prioritizing those with active symptoms, even as evidence mounted of a large 
percentage of asymptomatic carriers. The CDC new guidelines were expanded to include “testing is recommended for 
all close contacts of persons with SARS-CoV-2 infection” (CDC 2020a). Still, across the country, healthcare professionals 
who cared for confirmed positive patients were not given a test unless they developed symptoms. In contradistinction, 
80    Kristin Hedges, Gideon Lasco
the US president was tested on a regular basis. According to him, “Because I am the president, everyone gets tested 
before they see me” (Fox News, 2020). 
3.2.3  Invocation of Knowledge Claims
While Trump relied on testing as an accurate safety clearance check for himself, he continued to argue against 
widespread testing for the US population. A recurring political trope that Trump used was to blame testing for why the 
US epidemic was uncontrolled. When asked about the rising number of cases, his response was simply “because we test 
more people.” He went on to claim that the “US has the best testing in the world.”
Don’t forget, we have more cases than anybody in the world. But why? Because we do more testing,” Trump said. “When you test, you 
have a case. When you test, you find something is wrong with people. If we didn’t do any testing, we would have very few cases. They 
[the media] don’t want to write that (Lee, 2020).
When challenged to explain positivity rates or hospitalization rates, he repeated the same narrative of ‘when you test 
more, you have more cases.’ At his own Trump political rally in Tulsa, Oklahoma in June he stated we needed to “slow 
down testing” (Solender, 2020). In an interview with FOX News he stated “testing creates cases” (Begley, 2020). 
On August 3rd Trump tweeted: “Cases up because of BIG Testing! Much of our Country is doing very well. Open the 
Schools!” (Trump, 2020).
In a more alarming response of controlling the testing number that “makes the US look bad,” the Trump 
administration diverted test results from being reported to the CDC and instead sent to a private organization that 
reported directly to the White House (Huang, 2020). This development challenged the notion of ‘misinformation’ 
relative to the Trump administration’s understanding of statistics and suggests instead a realm of ‘disinformation’, 
or the intent to spread false information. In late August 2020, it seemed that Trump’s calls to ‘slow down’ testing were 
being implemented as the CDC updated their testing protocols to state that even those who have been in close contact 
with a COVD-19 infection but have not symptoms “do not necessarily need a test unless you are a vulnerable individual 
or your health care provider or state or local public health officials recommend you take one” (CDCb). This significant 
change appeared as an update to the CDC website without a public announcement. This shift drew stark criticism from 
public health experts and scientist since testing and identifying asymptomatic people with the virus are crucial to 
slowing the spread of the virus (Sullivan, 2020).
In early October 2020, President Trump tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 (Conley, 2020). He was monitored and treated 
by his own team of doctors at the White House and at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center. After downplaying 
the severity of the virus and contradicting medical professionals on the importance of wearing masks, many hoped 
that his own infection might change his political stance. Throughout his illness he was treated with dexamethasone, 
remdesivir, and regeneron (Gallagher, 2020). These medications were not available to the average US citizen and have 
only been used in severe cases. However, the president released a video statement on Twitter from Walter Reed Medical 
Center invocating knowledge claims: “I’ve learned a lot about COVID. I learned it by really going to school. This is the 
real school” (Trump, 2020a). However, after being released Trump continued to downplay the severity of the virus by 
using his own recovery as example and encouraging the country to ‘not be afraid’.
I will be leaving the great Walter Reed Medical Center today at 6:30 P.M. Feeling really good! Don’t be afraid of Covid. Don’t let it dominate 
your life. We have developed, under the Trump Administration, some really great drugs & knowledge. I feel better than I did 20 years 
ago! (Trump, 2020b)
3.2.4  Forging Divisions
One of the components of medical populism that has played out through the COVID-19 pandemic is the state versus 
federal response. The Trump administration has blamed the failing response and discrepancies across the country on 
state leadership while taking credit for any successes. Early on Trump made it clear that for states to get any assistance 
from the federal government they would have ‘show appreciation’ (Kelly et al., 2020). These sentiments and actions played 
Medical Populism and COVID-19 Testing    81
out across political lines, with Republican governors offered more assistance than Democratic ones. In one example, a 
shipment of FEMA supplies was rerouted mid-delivery to a Republican governor (Kanno-Youngs & Nicas, 2020). 
Further dividing the nation has been attempts to discredit Dr. Anthony Fauci (Lederman & O’Donnell, 2020), with 
testing again emerging as a point of contention. Throughout March and April, Dr. Fauci—a member of the country’s 
Coronavirus Task Force—regularly appeared in the president’s daily press briefings, becoming a household name and 
reference. As the US saw surges in multiple states after reopening, a schism over testing developed between task force 
members. Dr. Fauci testified before Congress and spoke publicly with the media, stating that the administration’s 
testing strategy was inadequate in identifying asymptomatic individuals and young people, therefore the country 
would struggle to isolate and contain the virus. After these public statements, there was a clear distancing between the 
administration and Fauci marked by ‘dramatically decreased’ meetings (Budryk, 2020). The evident distancing morphed 
into a ‘smear’ campaign as the White House compiled a list of public comments and advice by Fauci, ostensibly to serve 
as evidence of his flawed perspective (Lederman & O’Donnell, 2020). This populist critique of biomedical authority led 
many Trump supporters to oppose the medical establishment by spreading distrust of medical advice. 
4  Discussion
“The idea that medicine lies outside the boundaries of the political is rooted in a set of assumptions about the nature 
of medical knowledge and how it is—and should be—produced and circulated,” Briggs & Hallin (2010, p. 149) note. 
While health communication used to be the province of health professionals, it is now recognized that the expansion 
of social media has brought medical knowledge into the realm of public communication. When politicized, coronavirus 
testing emerges as an “evidence-making practice” in which political actors participate in different forms of “evidence 
performance” (Rhodes et al., 2019). What is at stake, then, in the politics of coronavirus testing is not just the invocation 
and circulation of medical knowledge claims, but the impact of such ‘evidence’ on public policy. 
 In this article, we have focused on the public sphere model of biocommunicability in which information is assumed 
useful for policy-makers collective decisions over public interest (Briggs & Hallin, 2010, p. 152). Within this model we 
have examined how politicians, using familiar political styles within the rubrics of medical populism, have asserted 
their own agenda into public health communication across social media platforms, thereby impacting their country’s 
pandemic responses. Taken together, our case studies weave biocommunicability with medical populism in an era of 
infodemics (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Elements of Medical Populism and COVID testing.
Element of medical populism The Philippines United States
Simplification of the pandemic Demands for “mass testing”, use of rapid 
antibody tests as an easy solution 
Demands for massive testing 
Spectacularization of crisis Setting up of testing centers 
Installation of testing centers by mayors; 
performance of tests in checkpoints
Federally tested facilities launched, ‘US 
has best testing in the world’, and later 
defunding testing 
Forging of divisions Healthcare establishment vs. maverick mayors; 
national vs. local government 
President Trump vs. state governors; 
federal vs. state responses; Republicans 
vs. Democrats
Knowledge claims Efficacy of rapid antibody tests; High number 
of cases is a result of more tests 
“Testing making us ‘look bad’”
In these examples we focus on the representation of political action that was communicated to the public. In both case 
studies the politicians used claims of the power of biomedicine and utilizing ‘advanced technology’ as evidence of 
successfully addressing the outbreak. In the first place, the political and popular demands for testing—encouraged by 
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political actors—oversimplify the entailments of pandemic response with the proposition that ‘mass’ or ‘massive testing’ 
can address the pandemic itself as a singular or at least primary solution. In both case studies testing was discussed 
as the simple one-step action needed to mitigate the virus. Missing from this simplified approach is a discussion and 
mobilization of the resources and capacity needs of multiple mitigation steps that make testing effective (i.e. testing, 
contact tracing, isolation). On the other hand, those who oppose testing likewise simplify the pandemic by claiming it 
will go away soon (e.g. Donald Trump), that the testing itself ‘makes up’ the pandemic (e.g. Rodrigo Duterte), and thus, 
either way, testing is ‘overrated’. 
This oversimplification of statistics can be classified as misinformation that can have powerful effects during a 
crisis (Starbird et al., 2020), given its ability to reduce feelings of uncertainty or provide a (false) sense of safety and 
control (Crabtree & Masuda, 2019). While many citizens may perceive that testing does not actually cause the cases, 
accepting this misinformation can help soothe the fears and anxieties created by increasing cases and expanding 
outbreaks. In this way the political trope shapes people’s perception of COVID risk and influences their behaviors to 
mitigate or ignore that perceived risk. 
Alongside oversimplification we have also seen examples of spectacularization of testing. This has been enacted by 
politicians who ‘perform’ testing through highly-visible acts of setting up testing centers, distributing testing vouchers 
for their constituents, and, in both case studies, through speeches and public statements. While demanding credit 
for a large number of tests as a sign of successfully addressing the pandemic, Trump also used this same indicator to 
oversimplify the outbreak, blaming the number of tests for the US ‘looking bad’. This argument has also been raised 
by Philippine government officials amid unfavorable comparisons with other Asian countries. These narratives were 
reproduced throughout public conversations and used as a justification for ignoring public health advice (i.e. mask 
wearing in U.S.).
As for the forging of divisions, testing is divisive at different levels, with attitudes toward testing organizing people 
along political fault lines (e.g. Republicans vs. Democrats; Duterte supporters vs. critics). Testing also divides people 
into ‹negative’ or ‘positive’ cases, which also has political consequences. Testing capacity and efficiency have been 
politicized, with such questions raised in both the Philippines and the United States to either criticize or praise the 
administration’s efforts. In the case of Donald Trump, testing failure were also blamed on other entities like China 
and the WHO. Trump has also forged divisions between the federal government and state government. After failing to 
organize a national testing strategy, Trump claimed that this was the responsibility of each U.S. state. In like manner, 
Rodrigo Duterte and his allies accused critics and health experts who object to his testing policy (or lack thereof) as 
fomenting ‘revolution’, pitting ‘the economy’ against ‘public health’ in a language that would not be out of place in the 
Trump administration. 
Finally, testing rests on knowledge claims about the test’s efficacy and what the tests ‘do’, both of which render 
the tests ‘controversial’. This has implications for public health, given that, as Rhodes et al. note: “Evidence-based 
controversies in public health intervention highlight that knowledge negotiations involve multiple actors of vested 
interest drawing upon, as well as generating, multiple forms of knowledge concerning how an intervention is constituted 
and valued” (2019, p. 261). The decision on who to test, when to test, and which test to use, influences the very outcome 
of testing, and the very evidence it creates, further underscoring the fraught nature of testing and its ‘multiplicity’ (Mol, 
2002). While the pandemic continues, these divisions are becoming even more heightened with questions surrounding 
testing: who gets tested, who will pay for the test, when the results will come out, in what situations are the results 
required, and ultimately, what the tests signify. 
Identifying and critically analyzing how knowledge is generated is an essential step to recognizing the impact that 
political styles have on the COVID-19 pandemic. Tracing the elements of medical populism within the two cases studies 
highlights how simplification, spectacularization, forging divisions, and invoking knowledge claims have influenced 
each country’s response efforts. This political style combines multiple forms of knowledge (i.e. experience, emotions, 
beliefs) (Myhalovskiy & Weir, 2004) for political gain. 
Our analysis of COVID-19 testing contributes to the public policy debate by providing evidence of the impact 
of medical populism during a pandemic. For countries to successfully respond to a health crisis, there needs to be 
government preparedness (Capano, 2020), effective ability to increase capacity (Serikbayeva et al., 2020), along with 
ability to mobilize across diverse sectors (Klingler-Vidra et al., 2020). Populist rhetoric and policies have been shown to 
increase barriers and challenges to enable these capacities within health care systems (Speed & Mannon, 2020). This 
paper reinforces and expands our understanding of these barriers by demonstrating how political actors using medical 
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populist perspectives to generate knowledge of a pandemic for the public and, in doing so, simplify and spectacularize 
the epidemic while also forging of political divisions. 
5  Conclusion
This article, in part, answers the call for a medical anthropology of epidemics to provide insight into the “factors and 
actors that shape the ongoing production of knowledge about epidemics” (Briggs & Nichter 2009, p. 197). The political 
actors in each case study have shaped knowledge of the epidemic in their countries, both in the way they construct 
the idea of ‘testing’ and in how they mobilize testing as an ‘evidence-making practice’ that shapes how the pandemic 
and their responses to it are measured. Here, we have identifyied how testing becomes a populist trope and presented 
a critical analysis of how knowledge is generated by leaders through specific political styles. In doing so, this paper 
contributes to “[breaking] down undemocratic pragmatic structures and biocommunicable models” (Briggs & Nicther, 
2009, p. 198), adding to vocabulary with which to hold leaders to account and to interrogate the political construction 
of biomedical technologies. Such a framework is urgently needed in addressing the impact of policies on people living 
through a pandemic. Indeed, our paper makes clear that oversimplification, spectacularization, and division will likely 
continue to accompany the use of testing, but what is yet to be determined is the final impact these actions will have on 
the full story of the COVID pandemic. 
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